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RULE 82 & TORT REFORM: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT 
OF ALASKA’S ENGLISH RULE ON 
FEDERAL CIVIL CASE FILINGS 
DOUGLAS C. RENNIE* 
ABSTRACT 
Alaska is the only American state that employs a variation of the “English 
Rule,” whereby the losing party in a civil case must pay the prevailing 
party’s attorneys’ fees. In recent years, advocates of tort reform have praised 
Alaska’s Civil Rule 82 as a model for tort reform to help rid the overburdened 
courts of low merit claims. But does Rule 82 really reduce meritless 
litigation? This study compares civil case filings in the District of Alaska to a 
sample of other comparable federal district courts. Although filings in the 
District of Alaska were lower than the national average, they were 
indistinguishable from the remainder of the sample. Other measures also 
failed to demonstrate any significant differences between civil cases in the 
District of Alaska and the other districts. These results suggest that reformers 
looking to reduce meritless litigation should look elsewhere for model reform 
measures. 
INTRODUCTION 
Alaska has long been unique among American states as the only 
jurisdiction that follows the “English Rule,” whereby the “loser” in a 
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everyone at the United States District Court for the District of Alaska for their 
comments and encouragement. The views expressed in this article are solely my 
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civil litigation must pay the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees.1 Other 
states follow the “American Rule,” which presumes that each party will 
bear its own attorneys’ fees.2 Alaska’s version of the “English Rule” is 
codified as Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.3 
Rising concerns about defendants being forced to settle frivolous 
lawsuits—particularly tort claims—in order to avoid litigation costs 
have led some commentators to propose adopting the English Rule in 
the United States.4 As explained by one commentator, “[i]f one believes 
that there are a substantial number of what amounts to frivolous 
lawsuits in which a plaintiff obtains a settlement simply because of the 
defendant’s concern about the costs of fighting the case, then fee shifting 
would probably serve to discourage suits of that type.”5 Perhaps 
inspired by the increased public interest in Alaska in recent years (a 
likely side effect of former Governor Sarah Palin’s rising profile), some 
academic and media commentators have suggested that other states use 
 
 1. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What 
Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1946 (2002). 
 2.   Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
 3.   ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a). 
 4.   See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 
644–46 (1989); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Regimes and the Cost of Civil Justice, 
28 CIV. JUST. Q. 344, 345 (2009) (“In the United States, the issue of adopting a 
loser pays rule has reemerged yet again as a topic of discussion, being pushed 
by conservative think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute and Common 
Good.”). Notably, similar concerns recently prompted the Supreme Court to 
reinterpret the long-settled pleading standard, now requiring plaintiffs to satisfy 
a higher threshold to survive a motion to dismiss at the outset of a lawsuit for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 
(2007)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing, inter alia, Easterbrook, supra, at 638). 
 5.   Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons from the 
Experience in Ontario, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 137 (1984). 
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Alaska’s Rule 82 as a model for tort reform.6 Indeed, this view appears 
to be gaining traction in some state legislatures.7 
But does Alaska’s “loser pays” rule really discourage meritless 
claims? This empirical study examines the rates of civil filings, tort 
filings, and other criteria regarding the civil cases in the United States 
District Court for the District of Alaska and compares them to data in a 
sample of federal district courts selected based on demographic, 
geographic, and legal similarities. The comparison shows that although 
Alaska’s filing rates are lower than the overall filing rates for the nation 
as a whole, they are very similar to many courts in the sample. This 
suggests that Rule 82 does not have a significant impact on civil filings 
in Alaska. 
Of course, this is not the first study examining fee shifting, either in 
general or with respect to Rule 82 in particular. Yet, much of the prior 
research comparing the American Rule with the English Rule has been 
theoretical.8 Alaska’s rule has been the subject of significant scholarly 
commentary and studies, most prominently a comprehensive study led 
by Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa W. Carns in the 1990s.9 However, 
efforts to compare the impact of the procedure in Alaska with other 
jurisdictions have been limited. Comparative studies examining fee 
shifting rules are generally handicapped by significant cultural, legal, 
 
 6.   See, e.g., Marie Gryphon, Common-Sense Justice in Alaska: The Lower 48 
Would Benefit From the Last Frontier’s Loser-Pays Rule, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 28, 
2008, 6:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226102/common-
sense-justice-alaska/marie-gryphon (“Perhaps U.S. state lawmakers whose 
attention has been captured by Governor Palin’s sudden celebrity will embrace 
an Alaskan export other than fossil fuels or King crab: loser-pays principles 
could help to make court systems faster and cheaper—and outcomes more 
just—from coast to coast.”); see also Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser Pays: 
Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1168–69 (1996) (predicting that other states will 
adopt fee shifting practices similar to Alaska’s). Of course, Rule 82 predated 
Governor Palin’s administration. See ALAN J. TOMKINS & THOMAS E. WILLGING, 
TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 3 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1986) (noting that the rule has been part of the 
Alaskan judicial system for “many years”). 
 7.   See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Texas Bill Takes Aim at Frivolous Lawsuits, WALL ST. 
J., May 24, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702303654804576341783811532312.html (comparing a “tort 
reform” bill being considered by the Texas state senate that would require the 
“loser” of a motion to dismiss to pay the winner’s attorney fees with Alaska’s 
system); Dave Williams, Lawmakers to Consider ‘Loser Pays’ Tort Bill, ATLANTA 
BUS. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2009/ 
02/09/story10.html (comparing a bill being considered by the Georgia state 
senate to Alaska’s rule). 
 8.   See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 9.   See Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: 
Attorney’s Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33 (1996). 
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and data keeping differences between nations and even states.10 Given 
the common procedural background and statistical collection efforts, 
federal district courts provide an ideal data pool for comparison. This 
study examines filing rates over a longer, more recent period of time 
(the fourteen year period from 1997 through 2010) than prior studies, 
within a set of otherwise procedurally similar jurisdictions, within the 
same country. The results suggest that policymakers looking for a 
“magic bullet” to eliminate low merit litigation should look elsewhere. 
They also suggest that Rule 82 is presently fulfilling its more modestly 
framed intended purpose—providing partial compensation to the 
prevailing party without limiting access to the courts. 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides background 
on the debate over fee shifting, describes prior commentary and 
empirical studies, and reviews Rule 82 in detail. Part II describes the 
methodology for the empirical analysis. Part III describes the results. 
Part IV analyzes the implications of those results.  
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part of the Article discusses the background necessary to 
understand the empirical data. The sections describe the English Rule 
and the American Rule, Alaska’s Rule 82, the commentary and 
theoretical research on fee shifting, several significant empirical studies 
on fee shifting, and the hypotheses about the effects of Rule 82 on 
federal civil cases that follow from the prior research. 
A. The English Rule and the American Rule 
At common law, a prevailing party could not recover attorneys’ 
fees from the loser.11 In England, however, a prevailing party could 
recover attorneys’ fees from the losing party as a matter of statute by 
1607.12 Most jurisdictions13 have since adopted some variation of this 
presumption, which is commonly known as the “English Rule.”14 Under 
this system, the prevailing party will typically recover part, but not 
 
 10.  Id. at 71 (“Overall, comparing Alaska’s filing trends and caseload 
composition to those in other states was difficult because the data often were not 
strictly comparable.”); see also infra notes 114–115. 
 11.  Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
 12.  Id. at 247 n.18. 
 13.  James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under 
the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 225 (1995) 
(“Throughout most of the Western world the English rule applies, and the losing 
party in a dispute is liable for the winner’s legal fees, up to a reasonable limit.”). 
 14.  See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1946. 
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necessarily all, of their fees.15 Recoveries in jurisdictions that follow the 
English Rule may range from one-half to two-thirds of actual attorneys’ 
fees.16 Policymakers have favored partial, rather than full, recovery of 
attorneys’ fees in order to deter parties likely to succeed from 
unnecessarily prolonging litigation and to encourage settlement.17 Fees 
are commonly factored into settlements in jurisdictions that follow the 
English Rule.18 
The United States, however, is unique.19 Under the “American 
Rule,” the prevailing party is generally not entitled to collect attorneys’ 
fees from the losing party.20 This anomaly developed out of an absence 
of specific statutory authorization in the United States, in contrast to 
countries such as England.21 The lack of a statute may have resulted 
from general hostility towards lawyers in colonial America and the fear 
 
 15.  TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at vii (“Even under the English rule, 
the winner can expect to pay a significant portion of its own costs.”); Kritzer, 
supra note 5, at 128 (noting that in Ontario, “[t]ypically, in litigation, a successful 
litigant is awarded ‘party and party’ costs to be paid by the other side” and that 
“‘[p]arty and party’ costs are only a partial reimbursement for a litigant’s legal 
fees; the litigant is then responsible for the balance of his or her lawyer’s fee”); 
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s 
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1574 (1993) (noting that as the English 
system developed, “the prevailing attorney generally recovered less than the fee 
that could be obtained from his own client” (citing John Leubsdorf, Toward a 
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
9, 12 (1984))). 
 16.  See Vargo, supra note 15, at 1599–1600 & n.265 (noting that in many 
countries that use the English Rule, it is “only a partial shift that does not 
provide full compensation to the winner,” and further indicating that in 
England, “winning parties are generally able to recover two-thirds of the actual 
solicitor charges” while “[i]n Australia, the winning parties usually recover 
between one-half and two-thirds of their costs”). 
 17.  TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 7–8 (noting that in England, 
policymakers considered whether “[r]equiring the loser to pay the full amount 
of fees might encourage the winner to prolong the litigation; on the other hand, 
requiring the winner to absorb a portion of the fees might encourage settlement 
or, at least, serve as a brake against dilatory tactics, harassment, or other abusive 
litigation practices” (citations omitted)); see also Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, 
at 1162–63 (“As an added safeguard, most countries follow a policy of shifting 
less than the full monetary cost of litigation. Because parties must bear a 
significant share of the marginal costs of litigation even if they win, they are 
shielded from the temptation to over-litigate a winning case for strategic or fee-
seeking reasons.”). 
 18.  See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1960 (discussing the practice in England). 
 19.  See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975); see also Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164 (arguing that “fee-shifting 
or the lack thereof . . . [i]s one of the great differences between America’s legal 
system and the systems prevailing in other advanced countries”). 
 20.  Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247. 
 21.  Id. at 247–57. 
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that such a statute might provide some justification for their legal fees.22 
Despite being an aberration, the American Rule is generally considered 
to be “deeply rooted” in American “history and in congressional 
policy[.]”23 
There are, however, exceptions to the American Rule in the United 
States. Congress and state legislatures have authorized the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees, or “fee shifting,” under many statutes.24 Some of these 
statutes operate in favor of the prevailing party, regardless of whether it 
is a plaintiff or defendant.25 This is frequently referred to as a “two-way” 
fee shift.26 Many statutes, however, provide that only one party—
typically the plaintiff—may recover attorneys’ fees.27 This type of law is 
known as a “one-way” fee shift, and it is the most common form of fee 
shifting in the United States.28 Unlike two-way fee shifting, one-way fee 
shifting provisions are not policy-neutral and are typically designed to 
encourage suits that the legislature has deemed further public policy 
goals.29  
Courts in the United States have also carved out exceptions to the 
American Rule, including situations where parties seek to recover a 
fund or property for others in addition to themselves, where parties 
willfully disobey court orders, or where the losing party has acted in 
 
 22.  See Gregory J. Hughes, Award of Attorney’s Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of 
Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 129, 131 (1975) (“[L]awyers in colonial 
America were generally considered disreputable and suspicious, so much so 
that in some colonies they were forbidden to receive any fees, or were barred 
from the courts altogether.” (citations omitted)). 
 23.  Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 271. 
 24.  Id. at 254–55, 260; see also Vargo, supra note 15, at 1588 (“There are over 
200 federal statutes and almost 2000 state statutes that provide for shifting of 
attorney’s fees.”); Kevin Michael Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee 
Shifting in Alaska, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 430 (1993) (noting that as of the 1990s, 
“there are now well over 100 federal and 2,000 state fee-shifting statutes in the 
United States” (citing TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 31)). 
 25.  Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 264 n.37. 
 26.  Vargo, supra note 15, at 1589–90. 
 27.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1946 (“Most of the statutes that abrogate the 
American Rule in the United States introduce a ‘one-way’ fee-shifting regime, 
whereby a successful plaintiff may recover some or all of its attorneys’ fees from 
the losing defendant, but a winning defendant cannot recover attorneys’ fees 
from the losing plaintiff.”); see also Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 264 n.37. 
 28.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1946; Vargo, supra note 15, at 1590, 1629; see also 
Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1165–66 (noting that “one-way” fee shifting in 
favor of plaintiffs is “a familiar element of the legal landscape” in the United 
States). 
 29.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 402–03 (Alaska 
2007). Notably, the English Rule effectively produces a one-way shift where a 
losing plaintiff is judgment proof. Vargo, supra note 15, at 1629. 
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“bad faith.”30 American courts have also typically honored contractual 
agreements to shift fees.31 
Notably, cases in federal court based on diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction have always represented a potential exception as well. As 
the Supreme Court has explained, a “state law denying the right to 
attorneys’ fees or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial 
policy of the state, should be followed” in diversity cases absent a 
contrary federal law or court rule.32 Deference to state fee shifting rules 
in diversity cases guards against forum shopping.33 The diversity 
exception, however, has lost much of its “practical significance” since 
nearly all states follow the American Rule.34 
B. Alaska’s Rule 82 
Dating back to before its organization as a territory, Alaska has 
been alone among American jurisdictions in awarding attorneys’ fees as 
a matter of course to the prevailing party.35 Since statehood, that 
presumption has been codified in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.36 
The “primary,” arguably even exclusive, purpose of the Rule “is to 
partially compensate a prevailing party for attorneys’ fees incurred in 
enforcing or defending the party’s rights, regardless of the nature of 
those rights.”37 The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that “[w]ithout 
the rule, the rights of the prevailing party would be less completely 
vindicated because of the uncompensated expense of litigation.”38 
 
 30.  Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257–59 (noting that courts are authorized to 
award fees under their inherent powers in particular situations, most notably for 
parties seeking to recover a fund or property for others in addition to 
themselves, where a party has willfully disobeyed a court order, or where the 
losing party “has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive 
reasons’” (citations omitted)); see also Vargo, supra note 15, at 1579–87. 
 31.  See, e.g., Vargo, supra note 15, at 1578–79. 
 32.  Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259–60 n.31. 
 33.  See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1173 (proposing the adoption of 
the English Rule in federal court, but discussing reasons why the English Rule 
should not apply to diversity cases, including the fear that it would encourage 
forum shopping). 
 34.  Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259–60 n.31. 
 35.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 398–99 (Alaska 
2007). 
 36.  Id. at 398–99, 398 n.24. 
 37.  Id. at 398. Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that Rule 
82 “is not intended as a vehicle for accomplishing anything other than providing 
compensation where it is justified.” Id. at 403 n.60 (quoting Ferdinand v. City of 
Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1979)). 
 38.  Id. at 398. 
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In its current form, Rule 82 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by law or agreed by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil 
case shall be awarded attorney’s fees” as calculated under the Rule.39 
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining which party is the 
“prevailing party.”40 “The prevailing party is the one who has 
successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one who is 
successful on the ‘main issue’ of the action and ‘in whose favor the 
decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.’”41 Where 
both parties prevail on a “main issue,” the court has discretion to deny 
attorneys’ fees to both parties.42 
The Rule sets out a schedule providing that a prevailing party 
recovering a money judgment may recover an additional percentage of 












First $25,000 20% 18% 10% 
Next $75,000 10% 8% 3% 
Next $400,000 10% 6% 2% 
Over $500,000 10% 2% 1% 
 
In cases where the prevailing party does not recover a money 
judgment, the Rule provides that the court shall award thirty percent of 
the prevailing party’s reasonable actual attorneys’ fees in cases that go to 
trial and twenty percent of the party’s reasonable actual attorneys’ fees 








 39.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a)–(b). 
 40.  Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083, 1092 (Alaska 
2008). 
 41.  Id. (quoting Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 
1327 (Alaska 1993)). 
 42.  Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham, 246 P.3d 927, 929 (Alaska 2011). 
 43.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1). 
 44.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(2). 
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 The Rule then provides courts with a degree of discretion to vary 
the amount of the fee award based on consideration of the following 
factors: 
(A) The complexity of the litigation; 
(B) The length of trial; 
(C) The reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates and the 
number of hours expended; 
(D) The reasonableness of the number of attorneys used; 
(E) The attorneys’ efforts to minimize fees; 
(F) The reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by 
each side; 
(G) Vexatious or bad faith conduct; 
(H) The relationship between the amount of work performed and 
the significance of the matters at stake; 
(I) The extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to 
the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated 
litigants from voluntary use of the courts; 
(J) The extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party 
suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart 
from the case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by 
others against the prevailing party or its insurer; and 
(K) Other equitable factors deemed relevant.45 
 
Courts must explain their reasoning for any variations.46 There are also 
variations on the formula for default judgments and cases involving 
equitable apportionment.47 A party must make a motion to the same 
judicial officer hearing the merits of the dispute to collect a fee award 
under the Rule,48 and the amount is frequently part of the negotiation in 
a settlement.49 
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that “strict application” 
of Rule 82 may offend due process by limiting access to the courts.50 
Several significant amendments took effect in 1993 in response to these 
concerns.51 Those amendments added the variance factors over 
objections that they would increase the amount of litigation over 
 
 45.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(4), (e). 
 48.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(c). 
 49.  See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1960 (suggesting that fees are usually not an 
“explicit[]” part of settlements in Alaska, but may also be “essentially a part of 
the negotiation”). 
 50.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 394 (Alaska 2007) 
(citing Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973)). 
 51.  Id. at 406 & n.81; see also Kordziel, supra note 24, at 446, 448 (noting that 
the amendments were intended to address a “lack of uniformity in fee awards” 
and require judges to articulate their reasoning for awards, and that they 
“clearly benefit[ted] plaintiffs vis-à-vis defendants”). 
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attorneys’ fees.52 The Alaska Supreme Court also added the provisions 
limiting the amounts recoverable by prevailing defendants to twenty or 
thirty percent of actual fees, depending on whether trial was necessary.53 
Previously, prevailing defendants had been able to recover up to eighty 
percent of their attorneys’ fees.54 
Notably, the Alaska Legislature has also sought to weigh in on the 
effect of the Rule. In 2003, it passed a bill abrogating a judicially created 
“public interest” exception, which had the effect of transforming Rule 82 
into a one-way fee shift for qualifying public interest plaintiffs.55 The 
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the law but noted that the variance 
factors, particularly subsection (I), still apply.56 
Rule 82 applies to many cases in the United States District Court for 
the District of Alaska. Specifically, the Rule applies in diversity cases, 
federal question cases with supplemental jurisdiction over state-law 
claims,57 and certain other cases involving state interests that are 
sufficient to provide a “hook” for the Rule to apply.58 The court’s Local 
Rule 54.3 acknowledges Rule 82 as potential authority for an attorneys’ 
fees award.59 
C. Commentary on Fee Shifting 
This section summarizes some of the commentary and theoretical 
research on fee shifting. It discusses the predicted impact of fee shifting 
 
 52.  See ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). 
 53.  Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406. 
 54.  See Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Alaska: Where the Loser Pays the Winner’s Fees, 24 
JUDGES’ J. 4, 6 (1985) (“Awards between 20 percent and 80 percent of actual 
defense fees are, as a practical matter, not reversible. These awards can amount 
to substantial four- or even five-figure judgments against unsuccessful 
plaintiffs.”). 
 55.  Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 391–92, 403–05. 
 56.  Id. at 405–06. 
 57.  See Disability Law Ctr. of Alaska, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 581 F.3d 
936, 941 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 58.  See Gentemann v. NANA Dev. Corp., No. 3:08-cv-221, 2009 WL 2486040, 
at *3 (D. Alaska Aug. 12, 2009); see also United States v. GBC, L.L.C. Contractors, 
No. A03-73, 2005 WL 846211, at *1 n.14 (D. Alaska Jan. 18, 2005) (noting that 
under the District of Alaska Local Rules, Rule 82 may constitute “authority for 
recovering attorney’s fees in” cases other than diversity cases). 
 59.  See D. Alaska Civ. R. 54.3(a)(2) (indicating that motions seeking an 
award of attorneys’ fees should “set forth the authority for the award, whether 
Rule 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal statute, contractual provision, 
or other grounds entitling the moving party to the award”); see also Disability 
Law Ctr., 581 F.3d at 940–41 (indicating that Local Rule 54.3 does not permit Rule 
82 to apply “[i]n a pure federal question case brought in federal court,” but 
“merely acknowledges that Rule 82 can sometimes provide grounds for a fee 
award in the District of Alaska”). 
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on litigation, arguments for and against adopting the English Rule in the 
United States, and commentary specific to Alaska’s Rule 82. 
1. Predicted Impact 
There has been a great deal of theoretical discussion about the 
likely effects of the English Rule on civil litigation as compared to the 
American Rule.60 Much of the debate concerns the impact of adopting 
the English Rule in the United States.61 Despite extensive discussion and 
debate, there remains a fair amount of disagreement among 
commentators.62 
Some have argued that adopting the English Rule in the United 
States would reduce low merit case filings,63 causing an overall 
 
 60.  See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164 (noting that the debate over 
the English Rule in the United States has been “largely theoretical”); Vargo, 
supra note 15, at 1619 (“Most analyses of competing fee-shifting systems have 
been based on theory and supposition.”). 
 61.  See infra notes 63–64. 
 62.  See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1947–48 (noting the “extensive” amount of 
“theoretical work” but “surprisingly little agreement among those who have 
undertaken these theoretical analyses”); Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164 
(indicating that commentators have been “unable to reach agreement on even 
such basic issues as whether the rules would be likely to affect the rate or speed 
of dispute settlement”). 
 63.  Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the 
English Rule Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 
44 (2006) (“American Rule plaintiffs are more likely to file frivolous suits and 
suits with a low probability of victory than English Rule plaintiffs.”); Marie 
Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System: 
An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 574 
(2011) (suggesting that a “loser-pays” rule “can reduce or eliminate abusive 
lawsuits, especially nuisance suits”); Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1161 
(arguing that the advantages of the English Rule “are manifold. Most obviously, 
it discourages speculative litigation—among the most persistent problems facing 
the American litigation system—and it limits the tactical leverage parties with 
weak cases can obtain by threatening to inflict the cost of litigation on their 
opponents. A claimant will hesitate before pursuing either a long-shot case, 
where a low or fluke chance of prevailing is made attractive by a high potential 
payoff, or an imposition-based case, whose settlement value arises from its 
threat of cost infliction, if he knows he will be responsible for the defendant’s 
reasonable legal costs.”); see also Hughes, supra note 22, at 163 (“[I]n at least one 
regard, payment of attorney’s fees by the loser might be the more desirable 
system, since arguably, the claims and defenses most likely to be discouraged 
would be the doubtful and less justifiable ones.”); Hughes & Snyder, supra note 
13, at 229 (noting that one aspect of “[t]he most compelling, and certainly the 
most often repeated, argument in favor of the English rule is the idea that the 
rule . . . discourages plaintiffs with large, low-quality claims”); Kritzer, supra 
note 5, at 137 (“If one believes that there are a substantial number of what 
amounts to frivolous lawsuits in which a plaintiff obtains a settlement simply 
because of the defendant’s concern about the costs of fighting the case, then fee 
shifting would probably serve to discourage suits of that type.”); Edward A. 
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reduction in the amount of litigation.64 In other words, these 
commentators believe that the American Rule causes unnecessary court 
congestion by encouraging litigants to file an inordinate amount of low 
merit or meritless claims.65 The amount of these claims, in turn, arguably 
raises the cost of goods and services to consumers.66 It is this potential 
for reducing low merit litigation that makes the English Rule most 
appealing to tort reform advocates.67 Others, however, vigorously 
 
Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence 
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 349 (1990) (observing that “the English 
rule discourages nuisance suits (i.e., claims that have a negative expected award 
for the plaintiff should the case go to trial) . . . . [T]he plaintiff’s implied threat 
under the American rule case may be credible, especially when the plaintiff’s 
cost of litigating the case is small relative to the defendant’s. Under the English 
rule, the nuisance suit strategy is less credible since a defendant who recognizes 
that a claim lacks merit has a valuable counterclaim given his costs are likely to 
be shifted if the case goes to trial.”). 
 64.  See Bungard, supra note 63, at 63 (arguing that a shift from the American 
Rule to the English Rule would result in a decrease in “the overall volume of 
litigation”); W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: 
Why is the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 410 (1999) (“Many who have studied the English Rule as 
applied in England have concluded that it causes court dockets to be much less 
crowded there than in America.”); Gryphon, supra note 63, at 585 (suggesting 
that the English Rule will result in an overall reduction in civil filings because 
“[t]here are reasons to think that the reduction in nuisance suits following the 
adoption of loser pays would be greater than the increase in small, highly 
meritorious lawsuits”); Kritzer, supra note 5, at 132 (suggesting that “the 
possibility of having to pay the other side’s costs if one loses” may explain lower 
litigation rates in Canada as compared to the United States); see also Di Pietro & 
Carns, supra note 9, at 63 (noting that “[i]f fee shifting ha[s] strongly pronounced 
deterrent effects, one would expect a lower rate of civil case filings, on the 
hypothesis that fee shifting discourage[s] some potential plaintiffs from filing 
cases”). 
 65.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 568 (“The American rule makes the civil 
justice system as a whole unnecessarily costly by encouraging the filing of 
[abusive] lawsuits, which defendants must either settle quickly or defend 
against at significant cost.”); Vargo, supra note 15, at 1591 (“It is argued that U.S. 
courts are congested because of nonmeritorious claims or defenses. Supporters 
of this argument suggest that the American Rule encourages frivolous 
suits . . . .”). 
 66.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 568 (arguing that “low-merit legal cases 
clog the American legal system and raise the cost of goods and services to 
consumers by forcing businesses that are sued to cover their legal expenses by 
raising prices”); see also Bungard, supra note 63, at 62 (arguing that the American 
Rule requires “the payment of an equivalent of a five percent tort tax on 
wages”). 
 67.  See Kordziel, supra note 24, at 429 (“Segments of the business 
community and other tort reform advocates have called for modification or 
abandonment of the American rule.” (citing Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney Fee-
Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 2154, 2156 (1992))); Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164, 1169–71 
(discussing the English Rule as a means of tort reform and noting that “[l]oser-
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dispute the premise that the courts are overburdened due to a 
preponderance of low merit claims.68 
Many have also suggested that the English Rule would increase the 
quantity of high merit claims where there is a small amount in 
controversy by making these claims economically viable.69 This effect 
would also arguably increase the overall quality of claims.70 Others, 
however, have suggested that the English Rule may deter some valid 
claims.71 Advocates of the English Rule respond that if potential 
 
pays, together with a range of other litigation reforms, made up one of the ten 
planks of the Republican ‘Contract with America’”). Tort reform advocates have 
traditionally favored measures such as caps on non-economic damages and the 
elimination of joint and several liability. See, e.g., Christopher T. Stidvent, Tort 
Reform in Alaska: Much Ado About Nothing?, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 61, 71–77 (1999); 
Bungard, supra note 63, at 24–25. 
 68.  See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103 (2010) (suggesting that 
“claims of excessive costs, abuse, and frivolousness in litigation may have much 
less substance than many think, and extortionate settlements may be but another 
urban legend” and criticizing “well-trodden clichés” to the contrary); Vargo, 
supra note 15, at 1631 (“The English Rule is offered as a cure for courts allegedly 
overcrowded with nonmeritorious claims and defenses. These assertions each 
require close scrutiny. U.S. courts are overcrowded; however, there is absolutely 
no empirical data from any source that indicates that the overcrowding is caused 
by nonmeritorious actions or defenses. To the contrary, evidence indicates that 
courts are overcrowded because they are inundated with criminal cases and are 
severely underfunded.”). 
 69.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 583 (“In addition to reducing the number 
of nuisance suits, most researchers agree that a loser pays rule would make 
viable some small, highly meritorious lawsuits that cannot be profitably tried in 
the current system.”); Hughes, supra note 22, at 165–66 (suggesting that fee 
shifting may encourage just claims in cases involving smaller claims); Hughes & 
Snyder, supra note 13, at 229 (noting that the other aspect of “[t]he most 
compelling, and . . . the most often repeated, argument in favor of the English 
rule is the idea that the rule encourages plaintiffs with small, highly meritorious 
claims”); Kritzer, supra note 5, at 136 (noting that “if a litigant were confident of 
winning, fee shifting might encourage pursuit of a smaller case which it 
otherwise would not be economical to litigate”); Snyder & Hughes, supra note 
63, at 349 (hypothesizing that the English Rule encourages filings of claims with 
low potential awards but high probabilities of success); Vargo, supra note 15, at 
1590–93 (noting that the arguments against the American Rule include that it 
may prevent justice in small claims because lawyers will not take the cases 
without a substantial retainer); see also Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute 
and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 747 (1988) (predicting 
that one-way fee shifting provisions would encourage more low stakes cases 
with a higher probability of success). 
 70.  See Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 244–45 (discussing “the popular 
hypothesis that the English rule improves claim quality by encouraging small, 
meritorious claims as well as deterring larger, more speculative claims”). 
 71.  See Davis, supra note 64, at 410 (“The downside of this effect in England 
is that the Rule discourages privately funded plaintiffs from bringing 
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plaintiffs are so easily discouraged from filing such claims, then perhaps 
they should never have been filed in the first instance.72 
To the extent that fee shifting does have an impact on the number 
of claims filed, a larger number of claims is not necessarily a completely 
negative development. Some have argued that if more claims are filed 
under the American Rule, it may generate a larger “stock of precedents” 
than the English Rule.73 Having more precedents, in turn, arguably 
makes it easier for parties to predict legal decisions and comply with the 
law, which also provides the necessary conditions to spur economic 
activity.74 
Advocates of the English Rule argue that it actually inspires 
potential defendants to make extra efforts to comply with the law, given 
that they know they will also have to pay a plaintiff’s legal fees if they 
 
meritorious claims, or forces them to settle early at a much lower recovery rate, 
in part because the cost of losing is always substantial.”); Kritzer, supra note 5, at 
137–38 (“The opposite side of the question is whether fee shifting rules would 
serve to discourage a substantial number of persons who had valid grievances 
but were concerned that they might not be able to win in a court of law, thus 
suffering their own damages and also having to pay the other side’s costs. The 
impressionistic evidence obtained from this set of sixty interviews points clearly 
to the deterrent effect of fee shifting. Many cases that are filed in the absence of 
fee shifting would not be filed if the strong potential for fee shifting did exist.”). 
 72.  James A. Parrish, Plaintiff’s View, 24 JUDGES’ J. 8, 53 (1985) (“I also 
question whether the system suffers that much when a plaintiff who lacks 
confidence in his position, even though it may be well-founded, elects not to 
pursue his claim.”); see also Bungard, supra note 63, at 43 (arguing that “the 
argument that the risk-averse plaintiff might be unjustly discouraged from 
instituting a tort claim to vindicate his rights if the penalty for losing included 
the fees of their opponents’ counsel appears to be theoretically unfounded” 
because a risk-averse plaintiff can settle or drop a claim before trial). 
 73.  Cf. Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 249. The American Rule may also 
make it less expensive for a plaintiff with an innovative claim to bring it to the 
appellate courts. See id. 
 74.  See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and 
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989) 
(offering reasons why “a high degree of consistency and predictability in the law 
is necessary to the successful operation of the legal system,” including because 
consistency and predictability allow for “intelligent planning and structuring of 
transactions”). 
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fail to do so.75 This “compliance effect” would theoretically magnify any 
reduction in tort claims under the English Rule.76 
Notably, while the English Rule is often offered as a means of 
reducing congestion in the courts, it may create additional burdens on 
the judiciary, which must determine the amount of an award.77 Some 
jurisdictions employing the English Rule address this issue by 
appointing a distinct group of judicial officers to decide fee issues 
separate from those who preside over the merits of the dispute.78 Of 
course, in such instances, resources are still being devoted to fee awards; 
they are merely being re-allocated from the judicial officers presiding 
over the merits to a separate group of officers hearing the fee issues. 
Apart from decisions to bring claims in the first instance, 
commentators have attributed a variety of effects to fee shifting rules. 
Some argue that the English Rule generally “increases the stakes” in 
litigation and may accordingly increase the overall amount of legal 
expenditures79 and encourage optimistic parties to litigate.80 At the same 
time, parties who recognize that they are likely to lose may be more 
likely to abandon their claims or defenses.81 
 
 75.  See Bungard, supra note 63, at 50–52 (arguing that “the English Rule 
encourages good behavior” and “greater compliance” with the law by increasing 
the penalties for bad conduct); Gryphon, supra note 63, at 592 (arguing that the 
English Rule produces a “compliance effect” by “mak[ing] legal compliance 
cheaper and legal culpability more expensive, [and by] motivating businesses 
and individuals to spend more money to ensure the blamelessness of their 
behavior”). 
 76.   See Bungard, supra note 63, at 63 (suggesting that a shift to the English 
Rule will result in improved “future behavior” as well as “decreased filings of 
low probability suits,” leading to a decrease in “the overall volume of 
litigation”). 
 77.  See Hughes, supra note 22, at 164–65 (acknowledging a number of 
problems with fee shifting, including the additional burden on the courts, the 
need to develop a standard to determine the amount of an award, and the 
impact on litigants who present good-faith claims or defenses but ultimately 
lose). 
 78.  See TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at vii–ix (discussing the role of 
taxing masters in the English system). 
 79.  Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 227. But see Gryphon, supra note 63, 
at 589–92 (arguing that the English Rule will not actually increase litigation costs 
based on the parties’ beliefs that they will eventually prevail because other 
factors, like case complexity, drive litigation spending). 
 80.  Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 350. 
 81.  See id. at 353 (“Rather than continue, a plaintiff may decide to abandon 
the case either before liability for legal costs is established or to curtail further 
liability. As a result, the English rule will encourage plaintiffs to drop their 
claims when (i) the claim appears weak, (ii) they receive credible signals from 
the defendant that the chances of settlement are remote, and (iii) when both 
parties are likely to incur large costs at trial.”); see also Olson & Bernstein, supra 
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There is also reason to believe that the English Rule may affect the 
likelihood of settlement. By increasing the cost of litigating, the English 
Rule may push the parties’ settlement positions further apart.82 At the 
same time, the increased stakes may make settlement more likely if the 
parties are risk averse.83 
Although it is common to make broad claims about the effects of 
fee shifting, the impact of fee shifting rules is arguably more nuanced.84 
Some have noted that the impact may depend on both the size of the 
case and the type of litigant.85 Professor Herbert M. Kritzer has argued 
that the effects of fee shifting should be evaluated in the context of an 
entire fee regime, including how fees are calculated and regulated in 
addition to who pays the fee.86 
2. Arguments For and Against 
Commentators have made a number of arguments for and against 
fee shifting, typically within the context of considering whether 
American jurisdictions should adopt the English Rule.87 Advocates of 
the English Rule contend that it is fundamentally fairer than the 
American Rule because it comes closer to making a winning party 
“whole.”88 As noted above, proponents of the English Rule also argue 
 
note 6, at 1162 (arguing that the English Rule acts as a deterrent to “parties likely 
to lose”). 
 82.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 587 (“Loser pays, by increasing the 
amount of money in dispute in any given case (that is, by ‘raising the stakes’ of 
litigation), may reduce settlement rates by magnifying differences of opinion 
between the parties about what each is likely to gain by going to trial.”); Hughes, 
supra note 22, at 167; Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 350 (suggesting that 
according to one model of predicting settlement whereby the parties are 
optimistic of their chances of success, the English Rule encourages litigation); see 
also Bungard, supra note 63, at 63 (suggesting that settlement is less likely under 
the English Rule because the quality of claims is higher and “plaintiffs will tend 
to vigorously pursue cases to the end of trial where the probability of victory is 
high”). 
 83.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 587 (“On the other hand, higher stakes 
could induce risk-averse parties to settle.”); Vargo, supra note 15, at 1620 (“The 
English Rule also escalates legal expenses for those choosing to pursue litigation 
and can make settlements likely.” (citations omitted)). 
 84.  See Kritzer, supra note 5, at 133, 135–36 (noting that many interviewees 
in Toronto thought that the effects of fee shifting were stronger in smaller cases, 
and on individuals, as opposed to corporate entities). 
 85.  See id. 
 86.  See Kritzer, supra note 4, at 345, 365–66. 
 87.  Cf. supra notes 63–64. 
 88.  See Bungard, supra note 63, at 54, 59 (arguing that “[t]he American 
Rule . . . promotes the annihilation of the notion of personal responsibility” and 
that it “creates a type of moral hazard” because unsuccessful plaintiffs do not 
bear “the downside risks” of their behavior); Gryphon, supra note 63, at 568–69 
(suggesting that the American Rule is unfair to successful defendants, who must 
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that it reduces court congestion by reducing filings of little or no merit, 
inspires compliance with the law by potential tort defendants, and 
reduces the cost of goods and services.89 Some have also asserted that 
the American Rule may discourage productive activities by “well-
meaning persons placed in danger of open-ended legal jeopardy.”90 
These commentators accordingly believe that the English Rule can help 
eliminate a major source of the larger public’s dissatisfaction with the 
legal system.91 
Opponents of the English Rule argue that it represents an 
inappropriate barrier to the courts and suppresses legitimate claims.92 
They question the premise that the courts are inundated with low merit 
suits and offer alternative explanations for problems with the civil 
justice system, including that it has suffered as a result of more 
resources being devoted to the criminal justice system.93 They also note 
that other means of providing access to the courts in countries that 
follow the English Rule—such as more extensive legal aid and union 
funding—do not exist in the United States.94 They further contend that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is a more effective tool in 
discouraging meritless lawsuits.95 
Some of these commentators have noted that litigation can be 
uncertain, and there is not a readily apparent hero and villain in every 
 
still bear the costs of their legal expenses, and deserving plaintiffs, who often 
lose part of their compensation as a contingent fee or cannot get a lawyer to 
represent them because their claims are not worth enough); Hughes, supra note 
22, at 169 (“The basic premise behind the practice is virtually beyond reproach: 
to shift the burden of the litigation to the party who is more likely to have 
caused it in the first place, either by having injured the plaintiff, or by having 
brought the defendant into court to defend against an unjustified claim.”); Olson 
& Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1162 (arguing that the English Rule is “ethically 
superior to the current system” because it provides compensation to the 
deserving party). 
 89.  See supra notes 63–67, 75–76. 
 90.  Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1189. 
 91.  See id. at 1169–72 (noting growing public dissatisfaction with the legal 
system and public support for the English Rule). 
 92.  See Vargo, supra note 15, at 1620 (“The English Rule deters claimants, 
especially the economically disadvantaged, from pursuing litigation more than 
the American Rule.” (citations omitted)). 
 93.  See supra note 68. 
 94.  Davis, supra note 64, at 410; Vargo, supra note 15, at 1599, 1607–09. 
 95.  Kordziel, supra note 24, at 456–58 (arguing that fee shifting is not the 
optimal means of deterring “bad faith” litigation and that Rule 11 is a better 
vehicle for accomplishing this goal since it can be used to punish the attorneys 
rather than the clients); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (providing that by presenting 
submissions to the court, attorneys certify that the submissions are not being 
presented for an improper purpose and are warranted under the law). 
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case.96 They also point to the additional burdens of administering a fee 
shifting system on top of the civil justice system.97 Additionally, even 
those who accept the argument that there is an excess of low merit 
claims might still believe that the American Rule is preferable because it 
gives the benefit of the doubt to individual plaintiffs, as opposed to 
institutional defendants who are in a better position to diffuse the 
impact of the injustice.98 
For their part, advocates of the English Rule have proposed various 
means of addressing potential access issues, such as developing 
insurance to provide coverage for attorneys’ fees in the event that a 
plaintiff loses.99 They have also suggested other reforms, such as 
applying the fee shifting to each individual “legal initiative” (e.g., a 
motion or discovery request) as opposed to cases as a whole, in order to 
discourage speculative tactics by all sides.100 They have also noted that 
measures like Rule 11, which are aimed at reducing frivolous filings, do 
not necessarily address the problems created by low merit claims, which 
are not necessarily “frivolous.”101 
 
 96.  See Hughes, supra note 22, at 164–65 (“Courts exist to settle disputes and 
to resolve legal and factual issues about which reasonable men can disagree. 
There is not always a right side and a wrong side, and when a case could be 
decided in favor of either party, it seems unjust to penalize the loser simply 
because the court ruled against him.” (citations omitted)); Kordziel, supra note 
24, at 454 (noting that “[l]itigation outcomes are often unpredictable” and 
defeated parties may be “justified and reasonable in pressing a strong but 
ultimately unsuccessful claim or defense” (citations omitted)); Vargo, supra note 
15, at 1634–35 (“Since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized 
for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and . . . the poor might be 
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the 
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.” (quoting 
Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967))). 
 97.  See Vargo, supra note 15, at 1635 (“Also, the time, expense, and 
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes 
reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial 
administration.” (quoting Fleishmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718)); see also 
supra note 77. 
 98.  Kritzer, supra note 5, at 138 (“There is a normative or political argument 
to be made that it is better for society to place the burden of injustice on 
organizations because the impact of such injustice is more limited and diffused 
than if the injustice were to be borne largely by individuals.”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Gryphon, supra note 63, at 602–07 (suggesting that legal expense 
insurance can ameliorate the negative effects of the English Rule on low and 
middle income potential plaintiffs, who otherwise might not seek justice “out of 
fear that they might be liable for a ruinous fee award”). 
 100.  Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1162. This would necessarily increase 
the amount of resources the courts would have to devote to addressing fee 
shifting issues. 
 101.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 597 (distinguishing between mere “weak” 
claims and those which are “frivolous” as a matter of law). 
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3. Commentary on Rule 82 
Despite being a long-standing fixture of the Alaska legal system, 
Rule 82’s popularity has fluctuated over the years.102 Much of the debate 
over Rule 82 mirrors the greater debate over fee shifting. In particular, 
Rule 82’s influence, or lack thereof, on filings is heavily disputed. As 
noted above, the Alaska Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
purpose of the Rule is to partially compensate the prevailing party.103 As 
several commentators have observed, the purpose is not to reduce or 
eliminate low merit filings.104 The Alaska Supreme Court, as well as a 
number of commentators, has expressed concern that the Rule may 
impede access to the courts.105 Some have also expressed concerns about 
the Alaska Legislature’s elimination of the public interest exception.106 
Others, however, have suggested that if the potential award of partial 
compensation under Rule 82 is enough to deter someone from filing a 
potentially meritorious claim, the system does not suffer if they fail to 
pursue it.107 
Some have further emphasized that Rule 82, in conjunction with 
the offer of judgment mechanism in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 
can cause “a catastrophic result” for a plaintiff.108 This is because the 
offer of judgment procedure effectively transforms a prevailing plaintiff 
who recovers less than a refused offer into a losing party for the 
purposes of assessing a fee award, which may be more than the amount 
of the award on the merits.109 
Another issue of vigorous debate has been whether the Rule should 
be revised to provide full compensation. Some contend that full 
 
 102.  Compare Kordziel, supra note 24, at 443 (“According to a survey of the 
Bar conducted in March of 1992 by the Civil Rules Committee, a majority of the 
respondents opposed rescinding or substantially amending Rule 82.” (citation 
omitted)), with Hughes, supra note 22, at 130 (indicating that Alaska lawyers 
were “generally dissatisfied” with Rule 82 at the time and had called for 
repealing it at the 1973 Alaskan Bar Convention). 
 103.  See supra note 37. 
 104.  Kordziel, supra note 24, at 445 (noting that survey respondents 
frequently commented “that Rule 82 was not intended to be a weapon against 
frivolous litigation” (citations omitted)). 
 105.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 405–06 (Alaska 
2007) (citing Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5–7 (Alaska 1992) 
(3-2 decision) (Matthews, J., dissenting)); Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 
(Alaska 1973)); see also Hughes, supra note 22, at 162; Kordziel, supra note 24, at 
444. 
 106.  See, e.g., Abizer Zanzi, Note, The Constitutional Battle Over the Public 
Interest Litigant Exception to Rule 82, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 329, 352 (2004) (arguing 
that the law repealing the public interest exception is unconstitutional). 
 107.  Parrish, supra note 72, at 53. 
 108.  Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 6. 
 109.  See id. 
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compensation is necessary for Rule 82 to provide deterrent effects.110 The 
Alaska Supreme Court has generally favored partial compensation for 
fear that full compensation would limit access to the courts.111 Others 
have pointed out practical problems with full compensation, such as 
increasing insurance costs112 and the fear that it will cause attorney 
billing rates to rise.113 
D. Empirical Studies 
There tend to be many significant differences between jurisdictions 
utilizing the English Rule and jurisdictions utilizing the American 
Rule.114 Thus, isolating any effects from fee shifting rules can be 
challenging, and this problem casts doubt on the validity of cross-
cultural comparisons.115 Nonetheless, there have been a handful of 
 
 110.  Gryphon, supra note 63, at 608 (arguing that Rule 82 does not provide 
enough compensation “to adequately influence a plaintiff’s decision about 
whether to file suit”). 
 111.  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 406 (Alaska 2007) 
(discussing Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5–7 (Alaska 1992) (3-
2 decision) (Matthews, J., dissenting)). 
 112.  Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 7 (“If the Rule 82 schedule were raised to 
market rates, liability insurance premiums would have to be increased 
substantially in order to spread the much higher cost.”). 
 113.  Parrish, supra note 72, at 54 (arguing that full attorneys’ fees 
compensation would cause rates to rise dramatically). But see Hughes, supra note 
22, at 163–64 (suggesting that fee shifting has not led to the inflation of legal fees 
or abuse of the legal system). 
 114.  See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 595 (noting that “arguments for loser pays 
in the U.S. should not rely too heavily on international differences in litigation 
rates uncontrolled by other relevant differences” because “myriad other 
differences between nations make it impossible to determine the size of that 
effect compared to the many other reasons why litigation rates differ between 
countries” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996))); Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1949 (“In 
significant part, there are few studies of the impact of fee shifting because few 
legal systems have fee-shifting regimes, and it is therefore difficult to assess their 
impact in a rigorous fashion. Cross-national studies, such as a study comparing 
the United States (generally governed by the American Rule) and Canada 
(generally governed by the English Rule), are problematic because of other 
substantive legal differences between countries.”); Snyder & Hughes, supra note 
63, at 345 (noting that “the inherent difficulties in cross-jurisdictional 
comparisons and the lack of experimentation with alternative rules within 
jurisdictions have limited the opportunities for empirical research”); Vargo, 
supra note 15, at 1597–99 (discussing the problems with comparative analyses, 
particularly with respect to cross-cultural studies). 
 115. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1980 (noting that one of the problems “in 
assessing the truth of the proposition that fee arrangement affects broad patterns 
of litigiousness” is that “it is difficult to find good data comparing litigation 
patterns across countries” (citations omitted)). 
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notable empirical studies. Among the most significant studies are 
Edward A. Snyder and James W. Hughes’s studies of Florida medical 
malpractice cases and Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa W. Carns’s study of 
Rule 82. The findings of these studies, as well as two others of note, are 
summarized below. 
1. The Florida Medical Malpractice Study 
The State of Florida adopted a mandatory two-way fee shifting rule 
for medical malpractice cases from July 1980 through September 1985.116 
The rule was adopted, and ultimately repealed, at the urging of the 
Florida Medical Association (FMA).117 The FMA initially argued that the 
rule would discourage low merit claims, but it changed its position once 
it appeared that filings actually increased after the rule was enacted.118 
Some also contended that the rule had evolved into a one-way fee 
shifting rule in practice because prevailing defendants were generally 
unable to collect their attorneys’ fees from unsuccessful, but insolvent, 
plaintiffs.119 
The experiment offered a rare “opportunity for a within-
jurisdiction evaluation of alternative” fee shifting rules.120 Reviewing the 
data, Snyder and Hughes found that although the rule did not appear to 
affect a plaintiff’s decision to file a case, plaintiffs did appear to be more 
likely to drop weak claims under the two-way fee shifting regime.121 
Plaintiffs who proceeded with claims were more likely to settle them, 
which Snyder and Hughes took to indicate that the claims that went 
forward were of a higher quality under the English Rule.122 They also 
found some evidence that parties increased their litigation expenditures 
under the English Rule.123 
They did not find any evidence of an increase in small judgments, 
which they believed “cast[ed] doubt on the popular hypothesis that the 
English rule improves claim quality by encouraging small, meritorious 
 
 116.  See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 346. 
 117.  Id. at 355–56. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. Results like this may explain why business interests have generally 
been less supportive of efforts to adopt the English Rule than other potential tort 
reform measures. See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1171. 
 120.  Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 234. 
 121.  Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 377. 
 122.  Id. at 376 (“Not only does the rule increase the probability that plaintiffs 
will drop their claims . . . the frequency of settled cases rises relative to litigated 
cases. This result reflects substantial changes in the set of claims not dropped.”). 
 123.  Id. at 374; see also Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 238 (noting that 
defense expenditures were generally “significantly higher” under the English 
Rule). 
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claims as well as deterring larger, more speculative claims.”124 They also 
noted that plaintiffs were more likely to win and that judgments were 
higher.125 They suggested that this result could come about because 
plaintiffs had to discount their anticipated victory against the possibility 
of a loss accompanied by liability for the defendant’s legal costs.126 
Ultimately, they concluded that it was unclear whether the English 
Rule had a “deterrence effect.”127 They noted the higher proportion of 
dropped claims under the English Rule might be “due to plaintiffs 
dropping weak claims in lieu of pursuing nuisance strategies,” but it 
was also possible that risk aversion and the possibility of higher defense 
expenditures meant that “some meritorious claims” had been 
abandoned.128 
2. Di Pietro and Carns’s Rule 82 Study 
In the 1990s, in the wake of the continuing debate over Rule 82’s 
effect on access to the courts,129 the Alaska Judicial Council undertook 
an extensive study of the Rule led by Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa W. 
Carns.130 The study drew on “the rule’s legal requirements with data 
taken from judge and attorney interviews and from state and federal 
case files.”131 
Examining state court case filings, they found that “Alaska’s per 
capita civil filing rate did not seem to differ substantially from rates 
across the nation.”132 Per capita tort filings were relatively low, placing 
Alaska within the lowest group of states, yet still similar to some states 
that did not shift fees.133 Tort cases also appeared to constitute a smaller 
percentage of the overall caseload in Alaska state courts than in the 
nation as a whole.134 The authors also found that tort filings in the 
 
 124.  Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 244–45. 
 125.  Id. at 238, 240–41. 
 126.  Id. at 245. 
 127.  Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 378. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5–7 (Alaska 1992) (3-
2 decision) (Matthews, J., dissenting) (arguing that high attorneys’ fees awards 
limit access to the court system); see also ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3) note 
(Rabinowitz, J., dissenting from ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118) (noting that the 
Alaska Judicial Council would be conducting “an in depth empirical study of 
the workings of Civil Rule 82” and arguing that the court should await the 
results of the study before deciding whether the Rule should be amended). 
 130.  See SUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA KELLY, ALASKA’S 
ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES (1995), available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfee.pdf (last visited November 6, 2011). 
 131.  Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 49. 
 132.  Id. at 63. 
 133.  Id. at 65, 71–72. 
 134.  Id. at 66–67. 
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District of Alaska were slightly lower than other jurisdictions in 1993.135 
Overall, the authors thought that the data suggested that “if fee shifting 
affects case filing trends and trial rates in Alaska, the effects are complex 
and may result in a net situation little different from that found in states 
that do not shift fees.”136 
The interviews appeared to confirm these findings. Only 35% of 
those interviewed could remember a situation where Rule 82 influenced 
a client’s decision to file a case or counterclaim.137 Interviewees also 
thought that it influenced strategy only in a minority of recent cases that 
they had handled.138 Some thought that the Rule was most likely to 
influence parties of moderate means, who would be more inclined to 
drop a “decent” or “average” case in addition to weak cases.139 A 
majority, however, did not believe that Rule 82 deterred “frivolous” 
filings,140 which they believed were driven by “non-economic factors.”141 
Some interviewees did think that it “occasionally encouraged a litigant 
to pursue more aggressively a case that he or she believed to be 
especially strong.”142 
Di Pietro and Carns made many other noteworthy findings apart 
from filing trends. Although tort filings were slightly lower than in the 
nation as a whole, they found that more Alaska tort cases appeared to go 
to trial.143 They also found that most fee awards were not made in tort 
cases.144 Additionally, fee awards were relatively infrequent—only 
about 10% of state cases and 6% of federal cases included a Rule 82 
award.145 The low frequency of awards appeared to be caused by 
frequent post-judgment settlements, with the prevailing party agreeing 
to forgo an application for a fee award and the losing party agreeing to 
 
 135.  Id. at 71. 
 136.  Id. at 72; see also id. at 66 (“In short, although the available data cannot 
exclude the possibility that Alaska’s relatively low tort filing rate is related to fee 
shifting, neither can one conclude from these data that Rule 82 perceptibly 
‘chills’ the filing of tort claims.”). 
 137.  Id. at 78. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 79–80. 
 140.  Id. at 81. 
 141.  Id. (“Comments from attorneys and judges suggested that ‘frivolous’ 
litigation was driven by factors generally outside the influence of Rule 82, 
particularly non-economic factors. These factors included litigating for a 
principle or because of emotion. A few attorneys described cases in which they 
thought their opponents had evaluated the case incorrectly at the beginning, 
giving their clients unrealistic expectations, and then felt obliged to follow 
through with litigation.”). 
 142.  Id. at 79. 
 143.  Id. at 69, 71. 
 144.  Id. at 75–76. 
 145.  Id. at 72–73. 
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forego an appeal.146 Federal fee awards were generally larger than 
awards in state cases.147 
These findings led Di Pietro and Carns to conclude that “the three 
most apparent effects of Rule 82 were that it (1) discouraged some 
middle class parties from filing cases that either wealthy or poor 
plaintiffs would file, (2) discouraged some suits (or defenses) of 
questionable merit and (3) encouraged litigation in strong cases that 
might otherwise settle.”148 The influence of the Rule on tort filings, 
however, was “by no means clear,” and to the extent that there was an 
impact, it was “selective.”149 
One key limitation of the study that the authors noted was the lack 
of a control group.150 Indeed, the authors observed that even state-to-
state comparisons are problematic because the differing “methods by 
which states count and classify civil cases affect filing rates, as do 
economic, social and cultural factors.”151 Nonetheless, the authors noted 
that many states within the low tort filing group “had significant rural 
populations and one or two large cities,” similar to Alaska.152 
 
 
 146.  Id. at 73–75. 
 147.  Id. at 76 n.204 (noting that Rule 82 awards were larger in federal cases 
and that “[t]he federal cases contained seven awards greater than $100,000. One 
reason for the difference may be that cases in federal court may involve larger 
damages and judgments than the average state court case. Another may be that 
attorneys spend more time on federal cases than on state court cases.”). 
 148.  Id. at 84. 
 149.  Id. at 80. As Di Pietro and Carns explained it: 
Analysis of Alaska’s civil litigation trends did not foreclose the 
possibility that Rule 82 discouraged potential tort claimants from filing 
suit, although the picture was by no means clear. The rate at which tort 
cases were filed in Alaska’s courts may be lower compared to other 
states, and torts seemed to constitute a smaller proportion of the total 
civil caseload in Alaska than in other states. Many factors other than 
Rule 82 could account for these data, such as cultural, social and 
economic factors, local legal culture or lack of comparability of data. 
Moreover, Alaska’s overall civil filing rates were very close to the 
median for jurisdictions that did not shift fees. Attorneys did not 
believe that Rule 82 obstructed indigent plaintiffs’ access to the courts. 
Further, more than half (55%) of the attorneys denied that the rule 
discouraged potential plaintiffs with frivolous or extremely weak cases 
from filing, although some thought that it did. Thus, if the rule played a 
role in discouraging potential tort plaintiffs from using the courts, it 
had a selective impact that depended heavily on case strength and 
parties’ assets. 
 Id. 
 150.  Id. at 77. 
 151.  Id. at 65. 
 152.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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3. Other Studies 
Two other studies are also noteworthy for their findings with 
respect to the impact of fee shifting on case filings. In the first, Professor 
Kritzer conducted interviews with attorneys and executives in Toronto, 
where the English Rule applies.153 He found that among the 
interviewees, there was an impression that fee shifting has a deterrent 
effect and that consequently, “[m]any cases that are filed in the absence 
of fee shifting would not be filed” under the English Rule.154 The 
interviewees, however, thought that the impact was more significant in 
small or routine cases.155 Professor Kritzer has also noted, however, that 
cross-national data “shows that the United States is not the most 
litigious nation,” and litigation rates are higher in some nations that 
follow the English Rule.156 
Second, Professors Stewart J. Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg 
studied constitutional tort filings in two federal district courts.157 Based 
on dispute resolution models, they had predicted that a one-way fee 
shifting statute would increase the level of constitutional tort filings in 
those districts.158 To their surprise, however, they found only “scant 
evidence” of such an effect159 and suggested that additional research 
was needed on the “effect of other fees statutes on filing rates.”160 
E. Hypotheses 
As the discussion to this point demonstrates, the theoretical and 
empirical literature does not suggest broad agreement on the effects of 
the English Rule on civil litigation.161 Nonetheless, assuming for the 
purposes of the study that fee shifting is an effective means of tort 
reform, one would expect that a jurisdiction utilizing a variant of the 
English Rule, such as Rule 82, should have a number of demonstrable 
differences with jurisdictions that utilize the American Rule. One of the 
most widely claimed effects is a reduction in the number of low merit 
 
 153.  Kritzer, supra note 5, at 125–26. 
 154.  Id. at 137–38. 
 155.  Id. at 133. 
 156.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1981 (citations omitted). 
 157.  Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 721. 
 158.  Id. at 745–47. 
 159.  Id. at 760; see also id. at 780 (“Surprisingly, there is little evidence that the 
fees statute led to significantly increased filings or to increased access for 
prisoners to the private attorney market. These last findings suggest that 
attorneys fees statutes may have less of an effect on filing rates than is 
commonly believed.”). 
 160.  Id. at 780. 
 161.  See supra note 62. 
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filings.162 The simplest way to test whether this effect is occurring would 
be to compare the number of low merit filings under the English Rule to 
those under the American Rule. Defining “low merit” cases and 
identifying them within broad sets of filings, however, is extraordinarily 
difficult.163 Nonetheless, if there are fewer low merit filings under the 
English Rule, this should be evident in other data. The possible effects of 
Rule 82 on civil filings, tort filings, civil trials, and the time to disposition 
of civil cases are summarized below. 
1. Civil Filings 
Commentary suggests that the English Rule should reduce low 
merit civil filings and increase high merit, but low stakes, filings.164 
Some have also argued that the English Rule also reduces the amount of 
meritorious claims.165 The overall number of filings should go down, as 
most expect that there would be more low merit claims dropped than 
additional low stakes claims pursued.166 Indeed, Snyder and Hughes did 
not find any evidence of an increase in smaller judgments under the 
English Rule, as it appeared that potential plaintiffs were discounting 
their ability to obtain a favorable judgment against their own potential 
liability for fees.167 
2. Tort Filings 
The reduction in filings should be even more dramatic when 
isolating tort filings. Unlike contract claims, tort claims are less likely to 
be governed by provisions altering general fee shifting rules.168 The 
possible “compliance effect,” whereby potential tortfeasors make 
additional efforts to comply with the law, should further reduce the 
number of tort claims.169 Di Pietro and Carns previously found that tort 
 
 162.  See supra note 63. 
 163.  See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 164.  See supra notes 63, 69. 
 165.  See Kritzer, supra note 5, at 137–38 (suggesting that the English Rule may 
“serve to discourage a substantial number of persons who had valid grievances 
but were concerned that they might not be able to win in a court of law, thus 
suffering their own damages and also having to pay the other side’s costs . . . . 
Many cases that are filed in the absence of fee shifting would not be filed if the 
strong potential for fee shifting did exist.”). In other words, if Rule 82 limits 
access to the courts by discouraging legitimate claims, this should also result in 
an overall reduction of filings. See supra note 105. 
 166.  See supra note 64. 
 167.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 168.  See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 
723, 750 (2011) (noting that “parties commonly contract for fee-shifting 
provisions to disincentivize nuisance litigation or defenses”). 
 169.  See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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filings in Alaska were lower than the national average, although they 
were not unusual when compared to similar states.170 
3. Trials  
If there are fewer low merit cases being filed, and potentially more 
high merit, low stakes claims under the English Rule, there should also 
be more trials.171 Di Pietro and Carns previously found some evidence of 
this effect in tort cases.172 Although such an effect might be less apparent 
in federal case statistics because of the amount in controversy threshold 
in diversity cases, some relative increase should still be evident.173 
Additionally, beyond possible effects on low stakes claims, if settlement 
rates are lower under the English Rule, as some have argued,174 then that 
would suggest that more cases should go to trial under the English Rule. 
4. Time to Resolution 
On the one hand, under the English Rule, cases should take longer 
to resolve because they are expected to be of higher quality and less 
likely to be resolved with pretrial motions. Additionally, if the English 
Rule makes settlement less likely,175 it is also possible that cases would 
take longer because more cases would have to be resolved on the merits. 
On the other hand, however, it is equally plausible that cases would be 
disposed of more quickly because there would be more small, highly 
meritorious claims, and fewer cases being pursued based on the 
possibility of imposing discovery costs on the defendant.176 If the 
English Rule causes more cases to settle,177 this would also weigh in 
favor of a shorter time to disposition. Either way, however, one would 
expect an impact on the amount of time until resolution. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The combination of Alaska’s Rule 82 and the comparability of 
federal case statistics provide a unique opportunity for studying the 
 
 170.  Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 66–67. 
 171.  But see Gryphon, supra note 63, at 586 (“High-merit, low damages 
injuries are also unlikely to be litigated to trial under loser pays because 
defendants would have no financial incentive to resist compensating those they 
have genuinely harmed. Loser pays should therefore promote immediate, 
appropriate, handling of small injuries in order to avoid litigation.”). 
 172.  See supra note 143. 
 173.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (providing that the amount in controversy 
must exceed $75,000 for federal diversity jurisdiction). 
 174.  See supra note 82. 
 175.  See id. 
 176.  See supra notes 63, 69 and accompanying text. 
 177.  See supra note 83. 
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effects of the English Rule on civil cases. This Part describes the 
methodology of the empirical comparison. The analysis was performed 
using publicly available data maintained by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts.178 Any party filing a complaint in a United 
States District Court must report certain information about the case, 
including the “Nature of Suit,” in a “Civil Cover Sheet.”179 The district 
courts maintain other information about civil suits, which the 
Administrative Office compiles.180 The two primary methodological 
decisions involved in analyzing this data were selecting (1) the districts 
to compare to the District of Alaska and (2) the measures to compare the 
districts. 
A. Selection of Comparable Districts 
No two states are exactly alike. Each state has many qualities that 
make it unique. It is fair to say, however, Alaska may have more of these 
qualities than any other state. It is geographically isolated from the rest 
of the country, has a larger proportion of males than most states, has a 
younger population than most states, has a large percentage of the 
population (primarily, Alaska Native) that is not Caucasian, has an 
unusual climate (to say the least), and has the largest land area but one 
of the smallest populations.181 Notably, it is also the only state without a 
law school.182 Any one of these facts could potentially affect civil filing 
trends.183 Needless to say, drawing analogies between Alaska and other 
 
 178.  See Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Statistics.aspx (last visited November 7, 2011). 
 179.  See Forms, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FormsAndFees/Forms/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/JS
044_1207.pdf (last visited November 7, 2011). 
 180.  Cf. supra note 178. 
 181.  See Appendix, Table 2. 
 182.  See Mary Berkheiser, Legal Education Comes to Nevada: The Creation of the 
William S. Boyd School of Law, NEV. LAWYER, Sept. 19, 2011, at 8 (noting that prior 
to the creation of the William S. Boyd School of Law at UNLV, Alaska was the 
only state other than Nevada without a law school). Alaska does not, however, 
appear to have the lowest number of lawyers per capita. See Highest Per Capita 
Lawyers, AVERY INDEX, http://www.averyindex.com/lawyers_per_capita.php 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (indicating that Alaska ranks 36th on the list of the 
states with the highest number of lawyers per capita). 
 183.  As noted above, many believe that cultural differences may affect civil 
filing trends in different countries. Cf. supra note 114. This may also be true of 
different states. Indeed, in addition to cultural and demographic differences, 
Alaska’s geographic isolation could potentially affect the level of diversity of 
citizenship filings in the District of Alaska. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) 
(providing district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions between 
citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000). 
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states can be a challenge.184 Although no state shares all of Alaska’s 
characteristics, some states do share more than one of them. The districts 
chosen in this study to compare to the District of Alaska were selected to 
maximize the number of characteristics in common. 
In this study, the comparable districts were restricted to single-state 
districts. The civil caseloads of districts in states with more than one 
district may vary significantly depending on a number of factors. For 
example, the location of a major city, state capitol, or prison may all 
affect the civil case composition of a district in a multi-district state.185 As 
there may also be variations in procedural law between circuits, this 
study concentrated on district courts within the Ninth Circuit.186 
These criteria led to the selection of Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Vermont, and Wyoming as comparable districts. Like Alaska, Montana, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming all have relatively 
small populations (i.e., less than one million people).187 Arizona, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon are all within the Ninth Circuit, 
and New Mexico and Wyoming are both considered Western states.188 
Many of the states have large non-Caucasian populations, and Arizona, 
Hawaii, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota all have 
significant (i.e., more than five percent) Native American or Native 
Hawaiian populations.189 Although no states have populations as young 
or as predominantly male as Alaska’s, many in the sample have 
populations that are more male and younger than the national 
average.190 Additionally, the only other non-contiguous state, Hawaii, 
was included in the sample. Data from the entirety of the United States 
District Courts was also included as a final comparison. Demographic 
and other data summarizing some of the similarities and differences 
 
 184.  Cf. Gryphon, supra note 63, at 597–98 (“It is difficult to generalize from 
Alaska’s experience with loser pays on account of Alaska’s unique geography. 
The state has enormous natural resources reserves, a large indigenous 
population, and substantially more men than women. Any one of these factors 
could affect the rate of tort litigation alone or in combination in ways that are not 
fully understood. For example, there is some evidence that men are more likely 
than women to be involved in legal disputes.”). 
 185.  See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism 
into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 725 & n.37 (2005) (noting that 
there is a large percentage of prisoner pro se suits in the Eastern District of 
California because many of the state’s prisons are located there). 
 186.  See 53 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 11 (Supp. 2011) (“Substantive and procedural 
law varies widely from state to state and among federal circuits.”). 
 187.  See Appendix, Table 2. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
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between districts, as well as the nation as a whole, appear in Table 2 in 
the Appendix.191 
B. Selection of Measures 
As discussed in Part I.E, if Rule 82 is an effective means of tort 
reform, the theoretical and empirical literature would lead one to 
hypothesize that it will have a number of effects on civil cases. These 
include a reduction in civil filings, a reduction in tort filings, an increase 
in civil trials, and either a potential increase or decrease in the time it 
takes to resolve civil cases.192 
Based on the available data, five measures were selected for 
examination in order to determine whether Rule 82 had any effect on the 
filing of low merit cases in the District of Alaska: the amount of civil 
filings; the amount of tort filings; the amount of civil trials; the median 
time to disposition of civil cases; and the percentage of civil cases 
pending three years or more. Annual figures for the fourteen year 
period were compared using the mean (or average), rather than the 
 
 191.  This chart was compiled using U.S. Census estimates for population 
broken down by sex and race, as well as median age. See Population Estimates, 
State Characteristics, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin for States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2009-03.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2011) (including files for each state with the population estimates broken 
down by race and sex); Population Estimates, State Characteristics, Annual Estimates 
of the Resident Population by Sex and Age for States and for Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 
to July 1, 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/ 
asrh/SC-EST2009-02.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (including files for each 
state with the estimated median age by year); Population Estimates, National 
Characteristics: Vintage 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
popest/data/national/asrh/2009/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) 
(including files NC-EST2009-03, showing United States population estimates 
broken down by race and sex, and NC-EST2009-01, showing the estimated 
median age for the United States by year); see also Court Locator, UNITED STATES 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) 
(including a map of the United States indicating the borders of the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeal). The data in the chart were estimates as of July 1, 2004, 
which is the closest annual estimate in the Census estimates (which are all as of 
July 1) to the midpoint of the data range for the study (i.e., March 30, 2004). At 
the time of publication, the state population data was no longer available in the 
format utilized to compile the charts in this study (the websites last visited on 
November 8, 2011, cited above). However, much of the source information still 
appears to be available—albeit, in different formats—through the U.S. Census 
Bureau website. See Population Estimates, Datasets for All Geographies, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU http://www.census.gov/popest/data/datasets.html (last visited Mar. 
7, 2012) (view the “Vintage 2009 State Population” datasets for information 
concerning state population estimates by race, sex, and age). 
 192.  See supra Part I.E. 
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median, because the point of the comparison was to examine and 
account for as large of a sample as possible, rather than assessing a 
typical annual statistic for a particular district.193 
As discussed in Part I.E, the theoretical and empirical literature 
suggests that Rule 82 should reduce the level of civil filings in the 
District of Alaska as compared to other districts. The statistical reports 
prepared by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
include the annual civil filings for each district.194 The level of civil case 
filings, however, is widely believed to fluctuate based primarily on 
population.195 Accordingly, it was necessary to control for this variable 
by adjusting each year’s civil filings to account for the district’s Census 
population estimate for the same year.196 
Additionally, it is important to note that Rule 82 does not apply in 
certain federal civil cases—notably, cases that only involve issues of 
 
 193.  See RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD 421 (7th ed. 
2012) (noting that unlike the median, the mean “takes into account the value of 
all cases in the distribution”). Regardless, although some of the distributions 
may have been slightly skewed, use of the median would not have changed the 
conclusions. See Appendix, Tables 3–7. 
 194.  See Federal Management Court Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (including links to annual district caseload profiles: 
select “District Courts” for the relevant year, select the relevant district court 
from the drop down box, select “Generate,” in order to view the “Judicial 
Caseload Profile” for selected district for the selected year); Judicial Business of the 
U.S. Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (including links to Table C-2 of 
the “Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts” report, which includes total civil cases 
commenced in the United States District Courts for each year: select the “Judicial 
Business” report for the relevant year, then select Table C-2). In years where 
multiple reports were available, the one for September was used to maintain 
continuity with earlier years, where only the September reports are available. 
 195.  See, e.g., Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 65–66 (comparing Alaska’s 
tort filing rate to other states “per 100,000 population”); Kritzer, supra note 1, at 
1981–82 (discussing civil litigation rates in various nations “per 1,000 
Population”). 
 196.  See Population Estimates, Evaluation Estimates - 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/research/eval-estimates/eval-est2010.html 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (including population estimates for the United States, 
the states, and Puerto Rico from 2000 through 2010 in file NST-PEST2010-01); 
State Population Estimates and Demographic Components of Population Change: 
Annual Time Series, April 1, 1990 Census to July 1, 2000 Estimate, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/eval-estimates/national-regional-
state/ST-2000-7.txt (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (including population estimates for 
the United States and each state from 1997 through 1999). Where the Census 
estimates conflicted, the more recent estimate was used. Also, as of the time of 
the publication of this Article, the data table for the 1990s was no longer 
available on the U.S. Census Bureau website. However, it remains on file with 
the Author. 
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federal law.197 Arguably, isolating civil filings where jurisdiction is 
based on diversity of citizenship would provide a more accurate 
measure. Unfortunately, that data is not available.198 Regardless, 
focusing solely on diversity filings would omit some cases where Rule 
82 would potentially apply,199 and in any event, prior research has 
utilized approximations to measure the effects of fee shifting rules on 
federal filings.200 Moreover, there are similar issues with the widely 
accepted data from the Alaska state courts, as Rule 82 does not apply 
where another state’s law controls, federal law controls, a statute 
specifically provides otherwise, or the parties have otherwise agreed.201 
Nonetheless, if the Rule is as powerful and fee shifting is as ingrained in 
the Alaskan legal culture as some have suggested,202 there should still be 
an identifiable reduction in civil filings in the District of Alaska when 
compared to other districts in the sample. 
The data for tort filings was compiled in the same manner as the 
data for civil filings.203 Total tort filings were obtained by combining the 
Administrative Office’s “Nature of Suit” codes for categories “Personal 
Injury/Product Liability” and torts other than “Personal Injury/Product 
Liability.”204 The tort filing data likely represents a greater percentage of 
cases where Rule 82 may potentially apply than the general civil filing 
data because there are more diversity cases and because a relatively 
small percentage of tort cases are initiated by the federal government.205 
 
 197.  See supra notes 57–58. 
 198.  The information is collected, see supra note 179, but has not been 
reported by the Administrative Office on a district-by-district basis. 
 199.  See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 200.  Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 757 (making comparisons using 
“the Administrative Office category that most closely correspond[ed]” with the 
types of cases that the researchers were studying). 
 201.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a) (providing that the fee shifting rule applies 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties”); Alaska v. 
Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 403 (Alaska 2007) (noting that in cases 
where fee shifting provisions are “intertwined with substantive statutes” those 
provisions “govern the award of fees rather than Rule 82”); Ferdinand v. City of 
Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1979) (finding that attorneys’ fees awards in 
federal civil rights actions in Alaska state court are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
rather than Rule 82). 
 202.  See supra note 6; infra note 225. 
 203.  See supra notes 194–196 and accompanying text. 
 204.  See Nature of Suit/Offense Codes, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/fcmcodes2009.pl (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) 
(listing the tort codes as civil code categories “B” and “H”). 
 205.  See, e.g., Table C-2 U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of 
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 
2004, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2004/appendices/c2.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (showing 
that in 2004, 43,919 out of 55,023, or 79.82%, of tort filings were based on 
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Annual data for civil trials, median time from filing to disposition, 
and percentage of cases pending three years or more were compiled 
using the annual Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts reports.206 Civil 
trials included both jury and bench trials.207 Civil trials were controlled 
for population, while median time to disposition and percentage of 
cases pending three or more years were not. 
III. RESULTS 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results. Complete data appears 
in Tables 3 through 7.208 As discussed in more detail below, the data do 
not show any strong differences between the District of Alaska and the 















diversity of citizenship and only 2,258, or 4.1%, involved the United States as a 
plaintiff or defendant). 
 206.  See Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 
2011) (including links to the annual Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts reports 
for 1997 through 2010; data for civil trials appear in Table C-7, data for median 
time from filing to disposition appear in Table C-5, and data for the percentage 
of cases pending three years or more appear in Table C-6). Table C-6 is missing 
from the Judicial Business report for 2002, and accordingly, data for the 
percentage of cases pending three or more years for that year was omitted. With 
respect to the median time from filing to disposition, more precise (i.e., 
unrounded) statistics were available for the individual districts for the years 
1997 through 1999 in the Judicial Caseload Profiles. See supra note 194. 
Accordingly, the more precise data was used for those years. 
 207.  See, e.g., Table C-7 U.S. District Courts-Civil and Criminal Trials Completed, 
by District, During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 1997, UNITED 
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2004/appendices/c7.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 208.  See Appendix. 
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Table 1. Average Annual Statistics for  
































91.31 19.60 2.29 8.53 11.06 
Alaska 67.99 14.24 1.86 10.03 8.63 
Arizona 63.59 6.01 1.39 10.01 5.80 
Hawaii 70.08 12.84 1.32 10.06 8.53 
Idaho 45.14 7.13 1.48 11.85 5.61 
Montana 71.78 15.31 1.50 11.06 7.72 
Nevada 116.63 12.55 2.73 8.49 4.15 
New 
Mexico 
81.78 12.75 2.98 9.91 5.78 
North 
Dakota 
42.95 9.88 1.31 9.26 2.98 
Oregon 67.24 6.79 1.41 9.89 3.23 
South 
Dakota 
55.14 11.34 2.93 11.31 4.69 
Vermont 61.39 12.62 2.73 8.40 4.65 
Wyoming 67.30 16.97 4.80 9.43 12.95 
 
As shown in Charts 1 and 2, civil and tort filings in the District of 
Alaska were lower than the national average but higher than many of 





 209.  These results are consistent with Di Pietro and Carns’s findings. See Di 
Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 65. They found that the tort filing rates in Alaska 
state court “fell in the lowest group” of states, but still resembled rates in some 
“jurisdictions that do not shift attorney’s fees.” Id. Notably, however, Di Pietro 
and Carns found that Alaska state court civil filings “did not seem to differ 
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 Contrary to expectations based on the theoretical research,215 these 
results suggest that Rule 82 did not have a significant impact on the 
amount of time to disposition of civil cases in the District of Alaska. 
 It is possible that the results are consistent with the presence of a 
larger number of small but highly meritorious claims that were not so 
complex as to require more than three years to resolve but tended to 
take longer to resolve than a typical claim because they were pursued 
more aggressively. The problem with this explanation is that most of the 
other districts in the sample display the same pattern. 
 The data do not appear to show any significant differences between 
the District of Alaska and the other districts in the sample. This suggests 
that Rule 82 did not have a significant impact on civil filings in the 
District of Alaska. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 The results do not show any significant difference between civil 
and tort case filings in the District of Alaska and other district courts in 
the sample. These results raise a number of questions. First, why did the 
expected results fail to materialize in the District of Alaska? Second, and 
most prominently, what is the impact on proposals for instituting the 
English Rule in the United States? And third, if the results do not 
necessarily resolve the second question, what further information is 
needed in order to do so? This Part explores those questions. 
 Advocates of the English Rule are likely to point out, as they have 
previously, that Rule 82 provides less compensation than fee shifting 
provisions in other English Rule jurisdictions.216 Thus, the lack of any 
significant differences between the filings in the District of Alaska and 
the other districts in the sample may be due to the fact that Rule 82 is 
simply not strong enough to produce the desired results.217 The level of 
compensation provided by Rule 82 has been debated over the years, but 
has been set at its current, relatively modest, but stable, level since the 
early 1990s.218 Concerns over limiting access to the courts and rising 
liability insurance costs have prevented anything approaching a full 
compensation standard.219 The potential effects on court access for 
persons of little or moderate means, in particular, has been a lightning 
rod for critics of the English Rule.220 Some advocates of the English Rule 
 
 215.  See supra Part II.E. 
 216.  See supra note 110. 
 217.  See id. 
 218.  See supra notes 50–54, 110–113. 
 219.  See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See supra notes 105, 111. 
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have proposed alternate means of ensuring access to the courts, such as 
through legal expense insurance.221 It remains debatable, however, 
whether these proposals would work in practice.222 
 It could also be that the lack of differentiation between the District 
of Alaska and the other districts in the sample can be explained by the 
fact that those jurisdictions employ a sufficient level of fee shifting for 
particular claims so as to influence overall civil and tort filing rates.223 
Although not out of the question, this explanation is not convincing 
simply because many fee shifting statutes impose a one-way fee shift in 
favor of plaintiffs, which, if anything, should increase filings.224 
Moreover, fee shifting is unlikely to be ingrained in the legal culture 
when employed on a piecemeal basis.225 It would seem unlikely that 
claim-specific fee shifting would have the broad impact on claim filing 
that general two-way fee shifting is thought to have. Indeed, Schwab 
and Eisenberg’s study of one-way fee shifting in constitutional tort cases 
suggests that it did not have the anticipated impact on those claims.226 
 More than anything, these results suggest that more empirical 
research is needed on the nature of low merit and frivolous claims. It is 
evident that what sounds correct in theory does not always pan out in 
reality. Just a few of the important questions that need to be answered 
are: (1) what is a frivolous case; (2) what causes frivolous case filings; 
and (3) is the number of frivolous filings great enough to require 
 
 221.  See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 222.  Marie Gryphon’s proposal, which would require plaintiffs to purchase 
insurance before proceeding with a claim, depends on insurers being willing to 
offer insurance for potential low and middle income plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys being willing to subsidize the cost of insurance premiums. Gryphon, 
supra note 63, at 602–08. Regardless, the English experience with insurance 
suggests that it may create other problems. See LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, 
REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT xvii (2009), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A93-
56F09672EB6A/0/jacksonfinalreport140110.pdf (proposing various reforms 
aimed at reducing civil litigation costs in England, including curtailing broad 
two-way fee shifting so as to reduce the need for after-the-event insurance). 
Walter Olson and David Bernstein’s proposal, which would require fee shifting 
for each individual “legal initiative” as opposed to a case as a whole, would 
require a considerable amount of additional court resources to administer. See 
Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1162. 
 223.  See, e.g., Jessie R. Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, 
38 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 17–53 (2001) (describing the numerous statutory bases for 
attorneys’ fees awards in Idaho). 
 224.  See supra note 27. 
 225.  Cf. TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 61 (“Unlike in Alaska, where 
fee shifting has become an accepted part of litigation, the typical attorney in 
federal court who represents a losing party will not acquiesce to fee shifting 
without some opposition.”). 
 226.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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reform? Then, if there is a problem, reformers can craft measures to 
address the cause of the problem. 
 There is a substantial amount of disagreement among 
commentators as to whether a low merit or frivolous claim problem 
exists.227 Of course, the fact that there is a lack of agreement is no 
accident. Developing research studies to answer these questions is easier 
said than done. Indeed, defining a “low merit”—or even “frivolous”—
case is no easy task.228 Evaluating whether actual cases are objectively of 
“low merit” is even more difficult. Even an after-the-fact examination of 
a single completed case might not yield consensus.229 But the fact that 
the task is difficult does not mean that it cannot be accomplished, 
particularly given the immense amount of talented researchers 
interested in the issue. 
 This Author happens to be among those who, based on experience, 
believe that there are opportunities for abuse under the current system 
that are not adequately addressed by the existing rules.230 But drastic 
reforms should not be made based on supposition, regardless of 
whether it comes from this Author, other commentators, or five or more 
justices of the Supreme Court.231 
 
 227.  See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 228.  See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he term 
‘frivolous’ . . . as a practical matter . . . is simply not susceptible to categorical 
definition.”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(suggesting that “‘frivolous’ claims” might be “defined simply as claims with no 
legal merit”); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] case is 
frivolous if it is ‘of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact.’” 
(citations omitted)). The definitions provided by the courts are not necessarily 
helpful. For example, is a “frivolous” claim one that lacks merit, or one that is 
imposed for an improper purpose? See United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 
995 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining “frivolous” as meaning “groundless . . . with little 
prospect of success; often brought to embarrass or annoy the defendant” 
(quoting United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999))). 
Presumably, a potentially meritorious claim could be brought for an improper 
purpose. 
 229.  Furthermore, surveys, which are perhaps the easiest method to attempt 
to evaluate these issues, are also the most problematic because the respondents 
typically have an incentive to provide one answer or another. See, e.g., Miller, 
supra note 68, at 82 (indicating that based on discussions with practitioners, the 
“universal themes” from their comments were that “frivolous litigation is the 
lawsuit the other side brings against one’s client” and “abuse is whatever the 
opposing counsel does”). 
 230.  I have previously written about the need to reform discovery 
procedures that are prone to abuse. See Douglas C. Rennie, The End of 
Interrogatories: Why Twombly and Iqbal Should Finally Stop Rule 33 Abuse, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 191 (2011). 
 231.  Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (declaring 
that “it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by 
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 Just about every lawyer has probably been confronted, at one point 
or another, by someone who had a less than ideal experience with the 
legal system and has been called upon to defend the indefensible. It is 
obvious that the civil justice system is unpopular,232 but this is not a new 
phenomenon.233 And there is more than one explanation for why that is 
the case.234 Depending on the cause, there may be more than one 
solution to the problem and each of them should be evaluated 
carefully.235 Drastic reforms should not be brashly undertaken for the 
sake of “doing something.” Or—to paraphrase Clint Eastwood’s iconic 
character, Dirty Harry—even if the current system is less than ideal, it is 
functional, and until reforms are developed that demonstrably improve 
it, we should stick with it.236 
 The English Rule does make some intuitive sense. As a 
fundamental question of fairness, Alaska has long favored partial 
compensation to prevailing parties.237 This tradition has been ingrained 
into Alaskan legal culture.238 Indeed, the results here suggest that since 
the reforms of the 1990s, Rule 82 appears to be fulfilling its intended 
 
‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid 
instructions to juries,’ . . . the threat of discovery expense will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those 
proceedings.”). 
 232.  See, e.g., Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1169–70 (discussing 
dissatisfaction with the legal system). 
 233.  See Miller, supra note 68, at 54 (arguing that concerns about litigation 
cost and delay “can be traced back to ancient times”). 
 234.  For example, John F. Vargo has argued that “courts are overcrowded 
because they are inundated with criminal cases and are severely underfunded.” 
Vargo, supra note 15, at 1631. Recent comments by Justice Scalia, asserting that 
Congress unnecessarily expanded the federal drug laws, may lend some support 




 235.  Indeed, the speed of the civil justice system is something that is 
frequently criticized. If claims were resolved faster, that could potentially also 
address the problem of defendants being forced to settle “anemic” cases based 
on the threat of having to pay extensive litigation costs. Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
559. 
 236.  See MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Bros. 1973) (“I hate the goddamn system, 
but until someone comes along with changes that make sense, I’ll stick with it.”). 
 237.  See supra note 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 238.  See supra note 225; see also Kritzer, supra note 4, at 360 (“Fee regimes are 
deeply embedded in legal systems and become part of the broad legal culture 
encompassing potential litigants, lawyers, and adjudicators. That is, fee regimes 
shape the understanding and expectations of participants. Whatever the existing 
system is, it comes to be seen as normal and appropriate.”). 
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purpose of providing partial compensation without limiting access to 
the courts.239 
 But that does not necessarily mean that it makes sense to label Rule 
82 as a cure-all and package it for export alongside king crab and 
petroleum.240 Rule 82’s long, contentious history and many revisions 
demonstrate that it is not such an obviously beneficial procedure.241 Any 
states considering adopting similar rules should do so based on the 
primary justification for Rule 82: partial compensation.242 The data, 
however, do not appear to support claims that Rule 82 is an effective 
means of reducing meritless litigation in Alaska. Indeed, there already 
are a number of safeguards in place to protect defendants from meritless 
suits—most prominently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the fact 
that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. Whether these alternative 
safeguards can be improved to provide a more effective means of 
deterring meritless litigation is a question that deserves further 
exploration. 
CONCLUSION 
 In recent years, the English Rule appears to be riding a renewed 
wave of popularity among tort reform advocates.243 This has caused 
some commentators to invoke Alaska’s fee shifting rule as a model for 
reform to rid the courts of low merit claims.244 The results of this study 
suggest that those proposals are misplaced. Data from the federal courts 
show that civil and tort filings in the District of Alaska, while below the 
national average, resembled those in a sample of similar districts. Other 
measures also failed to reveal any significant differences between civil 
cases in the District of Alaska and the other districts. 
 The results of this study, rather than supporting the widespread 
export of Rule 82 to jurisdictions unfamiliar with fee shifting as a matter 
of course, suggest caution is appropriate. Some states may ultimately 
decide, as Alaska has, that some amount of partial compensation is 
appropriate for the prevailing party in civil lawsuits. But Rule 82 is not a 
 
 239.  See supra notes 37, 50. It is notable, however, that the elimination of the 
public interest exception occurred during the sample period. See supra notes 55–
56. Because it occurred midway through the period covered by this study, and 
because “public interest” filings may be too small of a component of the overall 
amount of civil filings to affect the result, it is unclear from this data whether the 
elimination of that exception reduced public interest filings. 
 240.  Cf. Gryphon, supra note 6. 
 241.  See supra Part II.B. 
 242.  See supra note 37. 
 243.  See supra notes 4, 6–7. 
 244.  See supra note 6. 
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“one size fits all” solution to the complex problems of our civil justice 
systems. Additional empirical research is needed on the nature of 
frivolous litigation and its causes before imposing solutions that may or 
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